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ATrORNEY FEES
Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687
Author: Judge Tacha
Plaintiff, Garrick, and her attorneys, Melton and Key, appealed an
order of the magistrate approving a settlement and apportioning a fund.
They alleged that the magistrate abused his discretion in reviewing and
revising attorneys' fees under two contingency fee contracts. In addition, Garrick challenged the magistrate's order directing that the funds
apportioned to the minor Garrick children be placed in a trust. Garrick
claimed that this violated New Mexico law, and violated the family's
right to freedom of religion.
First, the Tenth Circuit held that the magistrate did not abuse his
discretion by awarding attorneys' fees on a quantum meruit rather than
on a contingency basis. Melton was subsequently removed for cause.
The court found that no fee agreement existed between Key and Garrick. Second, the court failed to consider Garrick's objections regarding
the placement of her children's funds in a trust. The court reasoned that
the guardian ad litem, not Garrick, was the only party with standing to
represent the children's interests. Furthermore, Garrick's assertions regarding violation of the family's freedom of religion were held to be
premature and not ripe for adjudication. Third, the court found the
magistrate did not err in placing the settlement funds in the registry of
the court during post trial motions and during pendency of appeal. Also,
the magistrate did not err in holding he was without jurisdiction to order disbursement of funds in the registry of the court where his order
concerning the disposition and apportionment of those funds was on
appeal.
Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiff, Headlee, appealed a denial of a cost of living adjustment to
attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d) ("EAJA"). Headlee argued that the district court abused its
discretion in not granting the cost of living increase because courts in
other circuits had granted the increase. Defendant, Bowen, responded
that the courts are split on the issue. In addition, Congress did not find a
need when recently reenacting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) to increase the standard rate.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the award of EAJA attorneys' fees was
clearly within the district court's discretion. This discretion was appropriate because the district court was the most familiar with the case and
prevailing attorneys' fees. The court affirmed the award of attorneys'
fees at the standard rate.
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Morris v. Peterson, 871 F.2d 948

Author: Chief Judge Holloway
Defendants moved for an award of appellate attorney fees and costs
in a legal malpractice action, the federal district court in Kansas entered
an order awarding fees and costs for the appeal in the previous Colorado litigation, and plaintiffs appealed.
The Tenth Circuit found that the federal district court does not
have authority to award attorney's fees, either pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, or under the inherent equitable power of the court for bad faith
and vexatious conduct. The court held that the determination of the
right to such sanctions against attorneys for conduct on appeal is not
within the authority of the district courts. Rather, the authority is reserved to the court in which the conduct occurred.
Research-Planning,Inc. v. Segal, 872 F.2d 335

Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Research-Planning, appealed from an order of the district
court affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of its complaint. Funds,
which were originally held in trust by First Capital Mortgage Loan Corporation ("First Capital"), pending a real estate transaction between Research-Planning and a third party, were placed in First Capital's general
account in violation of an escrow agreement with Research-Planning.
The funds were then used to cover pre-existing debts, before First Capital declared bankruptcy. Defendant, Segal, trustee in bankruptcy for the
estate of First Capital, recovered a portion of these funds, which were
placed in First Capital's estate under the bankruptcy laws.
The Tenth Circuit held that the bankruptcy and district courts' disposition of the case was in error. The court found that the district court
erred in assuming that a metamorphosis occurred as possession of the
funds was transferred. Research-Planning was not divested of ownership
of the funds simply because the funds were transferred to cover preexisting debts. The court stated that the trustee in bankruptcy held the
funds not as part of the estate but for the benefit of Research-Planning.
Sheet Metal Workers Trust Fund v. Big D Co., 876 F.2d 852

Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Sheet Metal Workers Trust Fund ("Sheet Metal"), commenced a district court action to collect delinquent payments owed to it
by defendant, Big D Service Company ("Big D"). The district court entered garnishment judgments against Big D's successor, H-VAC, and
against Kirkman, an employer of Big D. The district court awarded attorneys' fees for garnishment proceedings against H-VAC, but refused
to grant attorneys' fees against Kirkman.
The Tenth Circuit held that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D), applied to
an award of attorneys' fees against employer Kirkman in garnishment
proceedings. The court found that Congress enacted the statute to en-
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courage enforcement of employer contributions and to protect employee funds from collection expenses. Moreover, the court stated that
the Kirkman garnishment was an integral part of the post-judgment collection effort against Big D. The court remanded and ordered the district court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees for the Kirkman
action, and for the prosecution of the appeal.
TakeCare Corp. v. TAKECARE of Oklahoma, Inc., 889 F.2d 955
Author: Judge Moore
Plaintiff, TakeCare Corp., successfully brought suit against defendant, TAKECARE of Oklahoma, Inc. ("TAKECARE"), for infringement
of its trademarked name. The district court sanctioned TAKECARE
under the Lanham Act, which permits a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees "in exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). The district
court held that TAKECARE's continued use of the mark without explanation after notice from the plaintiff amounted to a willful and deliberate infringement, and thus an exceptional case meriting an award of
attorney's fees. TAKECARE appealed, claiming that its reliance on the
advice of counsel removes its otherwise willful conduct from section
1117(a) sanction.
The Tenth Circuit noted that under certain circumstances a party's
reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel may defuse otherwise willful conduct. However, the court refused to exculpate TAKECARE from
the sanctions because no evidence was offered at trial as to what TAKECARE's attorney had advised. Thus, TAKECARE failed to prove reasonable reliance. The court held that TAKECARE could not introduce
new evidence on appeal to show that the district court abused its discretion. The district court's decision was affirmed.

